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1. Introduction
1 1The  IMF,  originally  one  pillar  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  has  assumed  a  more
important role after this international agreement collapsed in 1973. Since the 1980s, one
of the main functions of this multilateral institution has been bailing out countries during
financial crises with emergency loan packages tied to conditionalities, often referred to as
structural adjustment policies.  As Andrade and Prates (2013) highlighted, these crises
have become recurrent in the contemporary international monetary system, based on the
fiduciary dollar as the key currency, on the top of the currency hierarchy, the floating
exchange rate regime and almost free capital mobility.
2 The interplay of these features has fostered financial market integration and financial
innovations (securitization,  derivatives,  etc.),  leading up to the financial  globalization
setting, marked by higher volatility of capital flows, exchange rates, interest rates and
assets prices, and a high degree of contagion, with financial turbulence spreading from
the epicentre of the system to its periphery. These volatility and contagion, in turn, have
a greater impact exactly on emerging economies2 whose currencies do not perform any
function  of  money  in  the  international  scale.  Therefore,  the  features  of  the  current
international monetary and financial system have reinforced the asymmetries between
the issuer of the key-currency and these countries, among which stand out the smaller
policy autonomy and the higher vulnerability to external financial shocks3.
3 It is possible to identify two different moments of the IMF´s performance in the post-
Bretton woods era. The first one, from 1980 to the end of the XXth century, was mainly
focused on emerging economies. The IMF made loans to countries in economic distress
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conditioned  to  the  implementation  of  certain  economic  policies,  namely,  the
aforementioned  conditionalities.  These  policies  usually  encompassed  the  following
elements: reducing government borrowing by higher taxes and lower public spending,
higher  interest  rates,  structural  adjustment  by  way  of  privatization,  financial
deregulation, and the capital account liberalization. Then, over that moment, the IMF had
also the key role of spreading the Washington agenda through the imposition of these
neoliberal  reforms.  These  reforms,  in  turn,  were  also  essential  to  the  insertion  of
emerging countries in the financial globalization, among which stand out the last one, i.e,
the financial openness. Yet, after the financial crisis of many Latin-American and Asian
countries in the second half of the 1990s, early 2000s, the IMF has begun to recognize the
volatile nature of capital flows and the role of external factors in emerging countries
financial crises. At the same time, it has switched its preference from pegged exchange
rates to floating exchange rates.
4 The second moment came in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, which has
triggered the Eurozone crisis in 2010. Indeed, the IMF went through an “identity crisis”
the  years  before  the  crisis,  especially  from  the  mid-2000s,  when  most  of  emerging
economies paid off their debts (with this institution and private creditors) and emerged
as creditors in the global economic system due to the policies of reserve accumulation as
self-insurance balance of payment strategies.  Indeed, to a great extent,  these policies
came as a response towards the trauma of having to resort to the IMF when they faced
financial crises in the late 1990s.4 In 2008, emerging countries accounted for 65 per cent of
global reserves, against only 28 per cent in 1990 (Vernengo and Ford 2014, Aizenman, Lee
and Rhee 2004; Rodrik 2006; Carvalho 2010).
5 Therefore, differently from previous crises episodes, these countries did not need to get
IMF loans and were able to launch countercyclical  policies  in response to the crisis´
contagion despite their lower policy autonomy due to the position of their currencies at
the lowest level of the currency hierarchy. Moreover, they also contributed to augment
the resources available for the IMF’s rescue packages. For instance, in April 2009, the G20,
which encompasses the main emerging countries, committed US$ 750 billion directly to
the IMF. Many of these countries also contributed to the new credit line launched at the
height of the global crisis (New Arrangements to Borrow - NAB), increasing the available
resources that contributed to the IMF sign some 35 new agreements since 2010 (Nissan
2015; Vernengo and Ford 2014).
6 In that second moment, the IMF was invited to take part in the operations to rescue the
vulnerable economies within the eurozone,  also sharing it´s  financial  burden.  In this
setting, the IMF joined forces with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European
Commission (EC) to form the so called Troika; or acted alone when loans were needed by
countries outside the eurozone. The conditions imposed to all the rescue packages hired
by European countries were pretty much the same as in the previous moment. However,
the  IMF  analytical  framework  underwent  changes  in  the  quest  to  understand
mainstream’s macroeconomics failure to provide a suitable set of instruments to avoid
and/or fight the global financial crisis as well as to deal with the new policy dilemmas
developed and emerging countries faced in the post-crisis setting, among which the new
boom of capital flows.
7 Hence, two intertwined questions arise regarding the IMF performance after the global
financial crisis: to what extent the new IMF analytical approach and the related policy
prescriptions differ from the ones prevailing before the global financial crisis? Has there
From IMF to the Troika: new analytical framework, same conditionalities
Économie et institutions, 23 | 2015
2
been a disconnection between the changes in the IMF analytical and normative approach
and its practice, in other words, the policy conditionalities embodied in the eurozone
rescue packages?
8 This paper aims at contributing to address these questions taking into account the US
financial  hegemony underlying  the  features  of  the  post-Bretton Woods  international
monetary and financial system, namely, the fiduciary and flexible dollar at the top of the
currency  hierarchy  and  the  almost  free  capital  mobility.  For  that  purpose,  the  IMF
analytical  and  normative  framework  and  the  policy  conditionalities  embodied  in  its
rescue packages are chronologically presented.  Section 2 summarizes the evolving of
these aspects from the IMF creation in 1944 to the threshold of the 2008 global crisis.
Section 3 focuses on the IMF performance after this crisis. The forth section sums up the
main conclusions of the paper.
 
2. Analytical framework and policy prescriptions
before the global financial crisis
9 The  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  was  created  in  1944  at  the  Bretton  Woods
conference, New Hampshire, as one of the elements of the International Monetary System
(IMS) in force from 1945 to 1973. This section presents a historical perspective of this
multilateral  organization from its  creation to the threshold of  the 2008 global  crisis.
Firstly, its performance during the Bretton Woods System is summarized, with emphasis
on  the  building  of  its  analytical  framework  and  the  emergence  of  conditionalities.
Secondly, the role of the IMF from the collapse of Bretton Woods to 2007 is assessed.
 
The IMF under Bretton Woods: the adjustment approach and the
emergence of conditionalities
10 The negotiations that came out with the so-called Bretton Woods system were based on
the White and Keynes plans, presented, respectively, by United States (US) and United
Kingdom (UK) representatives (Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes) (De Vries
1987; Steil, 2013). The two plans had similarities, such as the support of capital controls,
stable  exchange  rates  and  multilateralism  in  face  of  the  interwar  experience  of
destabilizing capital flows and competitive devaluations. Yet, three issues of discussion
and  divergence  stood  out:  the  international  monetary  standard;  the  mechanisms  of
external  adjustment;  and  the  new  global  monetary  institution  (Steil,  2013).5 These
divergences, in turn, were consequence of the two plans´ different underlying concepts.
11 The British proposal aimed at assuring policy autonomy for the adoption of national full
employment policies. In this case, a liquidity-creation mechanism allowing countries to
adopt  expansive  macroeconomic  policies  would  be  needed.  Hence,  they  could  face
occasional  balance  of  payments´  deficits  without  losing  reserves  and  contracting
domestic liquidity. The US’ goals were different. Having emerged from World War II as
the only developed country able to preserve its productive capacity and ability to export,
the US was afraid of becoming the target of everybody else’s exchange rate wars, beggar-
thy-neighbor policies,  protectionism and trade discrimination,  as was the case in the
1930s. Trade liberalization and exchange rate stability, with the creation of cooperative
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mechanisms of exchange rate adjustments, were among the most important demands of
the United States in the conference (Carvalho, 2009).
12 Regarding all these issues, White´s proposals were victorious. Indeed, the Bretton Woods
system mirrored United States´ interests, which emerged from the Second World War as
the undisputed capitalist hegemonic power. The dollar convertible in gold became the
international standard and the burden of balance of payment adjustment kept on deficit
countries. Consequently, the international monetary system was still anchored in a key-
currency and featured by a hierarchical and asymmetrical nature.  Therefore,  Keynes´
desire  of  establishing  a  non-hierarchical  international  monetary  order  with  an
international  currency  (the  bancor)  administered  by a  supranational  institution  (the
International Clearing Union) and with symmetrical balance of payment adjustments in
surplus and deficit countries continued to be a utopia (Keynes, 1980; Lichtensztejn and
Baer, 1987; Skydelsky, 2000).
13 A global institution, the IMF, established along the lines of the International Stabilization
Fund of White´s Plan, would promote international economic cooperation, provide its
member  countries  with  short  term  loans  to  finance  current  account  deficits  and
authorize  changes  in  its  parities  in  case  of  “fundamental  balance  of  payment
disequilibria” (Lichtensztejn and Baer, 1987). Hence, the IMF would help to soften the
external adjustment of deficit countries, avoiding deflationary process and enabling the
maintenance of trade with other countries as well  as high levels of  employment and
income, as stated in its Articles of Agreement. In order to fulfill this function, the new
institution was endowed with a treasury to which all member countries contributed.
14 As Carvalho (2009) pointed out,  the conference left open the crucial  question of how
exactly  should  the  Fund  operate  and  what  the  role  of  its  treasury  was.  During  the
conference, two views were confronted. On the one hand, Great Britain and most of the
participating countries supported that Fund’s resources should be considered a line of
secondary reserves to be accessed, at a cost, by countries facing balance of payments
deficits in a more or less automatic way. On the other hand, although not clearly spelled
out at first, the US, as the only country running a surplus on current account transactions
at the time and, by far, the greatest contributor the Fund’s treasury, was worried by the
possibility of giving a blank check to deficit countries.
15 The conference did not solve this dispute, which was resumed after the Fund began its
operations in 1947. The US insistence on limits to loans to countries running balance of
payments deficits finally paid off when the Fund began limiting the duration of the IMF
loans and imposing macroeconomic policy conditionalities on borrowers to guarantee
repayment at the agreed dates. Therefore, actually, the IMF institutional practices have
also mirrored the hierarchical and asymmetrical feature of the Bretton Woods system
and US interests.
16 Hence,  while  the original  goals  of  the  IMF,  stated in  the article  1  of  the Articles  of
Agreement6,  seemed to conciliate the US and UK goals,  in practice, the results of the
Bretton Woods conference didn’t reflect any kind of compromise. As the most important
contributor to the Fund’s endowment, the US positions prevailed, shaping the size of the
IMF´s treasury as well as its way of operation.
17 The Fund opened for operations with a volume of financial resources that could rapidly
become  insufficient  to  allow  member  countries  to  deal  with  balance  of  payments
constraints. Moreover, soon after its start, the US began insisting, over and over, on the
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need of limiting the maturity of loans, worried by the possibility of a quick depletion of
the Fund’s treasury if borrowers didn’t repay their loans fast enough. Another US concern
was the use of Fund’s resources to prolong the disequilibrium instead of macroeconomic
adjusting.  But,  in  order  to  ensure  the  efficacy  of  these  time  limits  on  loans,  it  was
necessary to remove any last trace of the notion that access to the Fund’s resources was
in anyway automatic. The borrowing country would have to give some guarantee that
resources would be effectively used to promote a balance of payments´ adjustment in a
reasonably short period of time. The notion of conditionalities7 as well as the Stand By
Arrangement (SBA), the Letter of Intent (LOI) and the performance criteria emerged in
this context (Carvalho, 2009).
18 During  the  Bretton  Woods  System,  conditionalities  basically  consisted  of  a  set  of
macroeconomic policies that were supposed to reduce domestic absorption and restore
equilibrium to the external accounts in case of temporary unbalance. If a fundamental
disequilibrium due to “wrong” prices were identified, a change of the par exchange rate
could be required.  These policies  were defined according to a macroeconomic model
called financial programming8, which specified a few macroeconomic identities and an
even smaller group of behavioral relations connecting monetary policy variables to the
balance of payments components (Carvalho, 2009; De Vries 1987).
19 The theoretical approach underlying the financial programming and the IMF´s programs
of stabilization and adjustment in this period was a combination of three approaches: the
elasticity approach, the absorption approach and the monetary approach to balance of
payment  adjustment9.  The  two  last  ones  were  mainly  developed  inside  the  IMF  by
economists of the research department, respectively, Alexander (1952) and Pollack (1957).
As De Vries (1987, p. 16) explained:
“The concepts, analytical framework, techniques, and methodologies that the Fund
staff has developed over the years have almost always evolved out of an immediate
practical problem that a member faced. For many problems, no readily available
theory or doctrine applied to which the staff could resort (…) Thus, the staff using
its  practical  experiences,  expanded  the  boundaries  of  economic  knowledge,
especially  in  the  1950s  and 1960s.  It  was,  accordingly,  in  actual  cases,  that  the
absorption approach and, a few years later, the monetary approach to the balance
of payments adjustment had their roots”.
20 Summing up, according to the analytical framework proposed by the Fund, balance of
payments  deficits  arose  when  macroeconomic  policies  overstimulate  the  economy,
increasing its absorption beyond its potential output. Hence, the policy conditionalities
that were imposed on borrowers consisted mostly of fiscal and monetary contractionary
policies.  Lower aggregate demand should reduce imports and raise exportable output
surpluses, reducing the absorption of real resources and restoring balance of payments
equilibrium. Yet,  the elasticities  approach  continued  to  be  reflected  in  the  Fund´s
emphasis on a member´s changing its exchange rates as to remain price competitive in
the world markets (Carvalho, 2009; De Vries 1987).
21 According to  Carvalho (2009),  over  Bretton Woods  regime,  the  Fund was  clearly  not
reformist. In other words, it did not assume as part of its mission to change the ways
borrowing countries set their policies. Adjustment, not reform, seemed to be the Fund’s
motto.10 At  that  time,  imposing  conditionalities  could  be  better  understood  as  an
instrument to guarantee that loans would be repaid. The pressures coming principally
from the US executive Directors pointed to the concern with the time a country could
take to repay its debts and the postponement of attempts at equilibrating its balance of
From IMF to the Troika: new analytical framework, same conditionalities
Économie et institutions, 23 | 2015
5
payments, rather than a concern with default per se and even less with shaping domestic
policies in borrowing countries.
22 Indeed, this adjustment approach was related to the very role of the IMF in that time. The
IMF main clients were developed countries and this institution had a marginal role in the
provision of  international  liquidity.  The problem of  dollar  scarcity that  featured this
system´s first years was actually settled by the successful US´ strategy under the Cold War
of  supporting  the  reconstruction  of  Japan  and  Western  Europe.  The  Marshall  Plan,
external procurements and the foreign external investments of US corporations enabled
the financing of current account deficits and few countries needed to resort to the IMF
(Block, 1980; De Vries 1987).
 
The changing role of the IMF after the Bretton Woods collapse 
23 During the 1970s, the changing international environment due to the collapse of Bretton
Woods and the oil shocks brought about changes in IMF´ conditionalities. The resulting
balance of payments disequilibria were considered to be too large to be treated by the
usual  demand  management  policies  that  characterized  the  first  decades  of  IMF’s
operation. In this context, in parallel to traditional macroeconomic conditionalities, the
Fund also defined structural conditionalities, that is, the commitment to changes in the
structure  of  institutions  and  incentives  of  the  borrowing  country  (De  Vries  1987;
Carvalho, 2009).
24 Moreover, the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate rules in the early 1970s freed
member countries from the obligation to respect the Fund’s determination on the setting
of exchange rates. It also led developed countries to appeal to the international financial
system for resources, in a context of floating exchange rates, instead of borrowing from
the Fund. As a result,  the Fund underwent an important change of character: from a
cooperative  institution,  where  countries  could  be  lenders  or  borrowers  in  different
moments, it became a financial intermediary, in which developed countries would only be
lenders and emerging countries could only be borrowers (Carvalho, 2009). In the context
of  the  Latin American debt  crisis  of  the  1980s,  the IMF became the manager  of  the
negotiations between private banks and borrowers countries.
25 Structural  conditionalities  significantly  increased  the  degree  of  intrusiveness  on  the
countries´ political decisions and included the financial openness along with the adoption
of  other  market-friendly reforms,  among which foreign trade and domestic  financial
liberalization, privatization and deregulation of the labour market. Therefore, the IMF
programs hired by Latin American countries after the debt crisis of the 1980s and by Latin
American and Asian countries during the financial crisis of the 1990s were programs of
adjustment (demand-management policies) and structural reforms. In some cases, as in
the Asian crises of 1997/1998, conditionalities were extended to cover inclusive industrial
policies, bankruptcy procedures, etc.
26 The active promotion by the IMF of “an open and liberal system of capital movements”
(Camdessus, 1997: 4) reached its top just before the Asian financial crisis, when the Fund
almost changed its Article of Agreement, including the capital account liberalization as a
goal that should be pursued by its members, besides current account convertibility. This
promotion, in turn, is totally in line with the interests of the United States (still  the
greatest contributor to the Fund’s treasury) in the international monetary and financial
system that has emerged after Bretton Woods,  featured by the flexible and fiduciary
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dollar and high capital mobility.  Indeed, capital account liberalization enhanced even
further  the  role  of  the  American dollar  as  international  reserve  currency as  the  US
hegemony in the post-Bretton woods era has been anchored in its financial power11.
27 Ironically,  the  depth  of  the  Asian  crisis,  which  reached  countries  which  had  so  far
adopted macroeconomic policies in line with those recommended by the IMF, triggered
changes in the IMF approach for capital flows to emerging countries. From the beginning
of  the  2000s,  key  IMF  publications  (Rogoff  et  al.  2004;  Kose  et  al.  2006;  IMF  2008)
acknowledged the “feast and famine dynamic” of these flows and their potential risks and
costs in terms of financial instability and overall macroeconomic volatility, but still gave
capital  account  liberalization a  prominent  role  for  its  “collateral  effects”:  with open
capital accounts,  international financial markets could impose discipline on economic
policies,  unleashing  forces  that  would  result  in  better  government  and  corporate
governance and thereby lead to financial development.
28 Even within the camp of capital account liberalization advocates, however, there was a
broad  consensus  that  financial  globalization  should  necessarily  be  combined  with
prudential financial regulation and risk management, and be carefully sequenced (e.g.,
Mussa et al. 1998; World Bank 2001). The IMF’s “integrated” approach envisages a gradual
and  orderly  sequencing  of  external  financial  liberalization  and  emphasizes  the
desirability of complementary reforms in the macroeconomic policy framework and the
domestic financial system as essential components of a successful liberalization strategy.
(IMF 2008, p. 3)
29 However, there were no clear criteria regarding the thresholds of financial liberalization,
a criticism the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office12 also raised (IMF 2005).  Financial
stability  was  assumed  to  be  one  of  the  key  preconditions  for  liberalization,  as  the
empirical results suggested, while financial globalization was assumed to be the best way
to achieve this goal. In its “integrated” or “sequencing” approach, the IMF at the same
time gave financial sector reform top priority when recommending the liberalization of
the capital account (IMF 2008, p. 14). However, it remained rather unclear regarding the
interdependencies between existing low financial stability,  high reform efforts in this
field, and simultaneous liberalization of the capital account (Priewe, 2011).
30 Yet,  from the financial  crisis  of  the 1990s,  early 2000s on,  emerging economies have
begun  to  accumulate  international  reserves  as  a  self-insurance  balance  of  payment
strategies (Aizenman, Lee and Rhee, 2004, Rodrik, 2006, Carvalho, 2010). As developed
countries did in the 1970s, emerging economies also tried to make sure that they would
not have to appeal to the Fund and subject themselves to intrusive conditionalities.
 
3. Analytical framework and prescriptions after the
global financial crisis
31 Over 2004-2007 the IMF had fallen somewhat into disuse and faced an “identity crisis”,
when many borrowing countries have begun to repay their  loans and to accumulate
international  reserves.  Consequently,  as  pointed by Broome (2014),  the IMF’s  income
earned from loan interest and charges fell by 2007 to less than one-quarter of its average
income during the period from 1998 to 2005, prompting the IMF to lay off 15% of its staff.
32 Yet, IMF´s fate has been turned around by the recent global financial crisis. From that
point on, two unprecedented situations arose: i)  the IMF focused its attention on the
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advanced economies crisis; ii) it took part in the rescue of some of these economies in
cooperation with the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB),
the so called Troika - while until then the IMF had acted on its own.
33 While the Fund dealt with emerging economies, it acquired a notorious reputation as a
staunch advocate of restrictive economic policies. In the academic literature, the IMF was
seen as prescribing such policies regardless of the specific circumstances in countries that
applied for loans to overcome balance of payments or foreign exchange problems. This
perception also dominated the media coverage.
34 Since the crisis, the tone has changed. A debate about macroeconomic theory and policy
within the mainstream has been triggered. The analysis of the IMF´s research department
headed by Olivier Blanchard and some mainstream’s economists joined the theoretical
debate and kept pace with the various macroeconomic policies governments launched to
deal  with  the  negative  effects  of  the  crisis,  beforehand  considered  unsuitable  by
mainstream economics. As Ban (2014) points out: “if you look closely, these changes (in
the IMF analytical approach) can be traced to the IMF staff research”. Recently, the IMF
has  been  portrayed  as  moving  toward  being  a  critic  of  austerity,  inequality  and
unrestricted capital movements.
35 There is substantial evidence that, after the crisis, the Fund has experienced a profound
change in its advices and assessment of the international economy. Yet, only a little part
of the new analytical approach translated into practice, as Vernengo and Ford (2014) also
supported13. With hindsight, it is clear now that this movement did not occur in a straight
line. In the following, its evolution will be traced in chronological order.
 
Rethinking the macroeconomic policy approach
36 By the end of 2008, with the aim of curbing the deepening of the crisis, the Group of 20
(G20)14 recommendations and governments´ attention shifted from rescue of financial
institutions in difficulty to the need to sustain aggregate demand. The IMF became a
leading spokesman for coordinating fiscal stimulus in the more dramatic drop since the
Great Depression of the 1930s.
37 At  that  time,  it  seemed that  the  lessons  of  the  Great  Depression  had  been  learned,
avoiding  the  mistakes  of  economic  policy  that  had  contributed  to  its  depth  and
international  scale.  The  final  declaration  of  the  G-20  meeting  of  November  2008  in
Washington promised to "use fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand, with quick
effect". The G20 London Summit in April 2009 sent an unmistakable signal that the old
Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990) was dissolving. Others considered that in fact it
could already been declared ‘dead’, as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown put it by
saying "This old world of the old Washington Consensus is over, and what comes in its
place is up to us.... We must reshape our global economic system so that it reflects and
respects  the  values  we  celebrate  in  everyday  life"(Westmore,  2009).  IMF  Managing
Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn emphasized that fiscal stimulus was being embraced as
an integral part of countercyclical economic policies.
38 The fiscal policy proved to be essential for the recovery of the global economy, or, at
least,  to  prevent  further  declines  in  the  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  of  advanced
economies. In March 2009, in a staff position note, economists of the IMF (Freedman et
al., 2009) reiterated the growing concern that the global economy was moving to a period
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of deep and prolonged recession. As a result, "global fiscal stimulus is essential to meet
the  aggregate  demand  and  restore  economic  growth.  The  IMF  calls  for  these  tax
incentives  to  be  adopted  in  all  countries  where  this  is  possible,  both  in  emerging
economies,  as  in  developed  economies".  By  saying  that  it  could  not  be  possible
everywhere, the IMF restricted its use because "although the combination of fiscal policy
and  monetary  policy  can  give  significant  contribution  to  prevent  a  vicious  cycle  of
recession and deflation, some countries have restrictions on funding, while others are
limited by high levels of debt".
39 Regarding  monetary  policy,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  crisis,  major  advanced  country
central banks had to rely on unconventional measures to stabilize financial conditions
and support aggregate demand, after the nominal interest rate rapidly met its zero lower
bound. The IMF’s April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report highlighted that “without a
thorough  cleansing  of  banks’  balance  sheets  of  impaired  assets,  accompanied  by
restructuring and, where needed, recapitalization, risks remain that banks’ problems are
likely to keep the credit capacity of the financial system too low to support the economic
recovery”. The measures differed considerably in their scope and included broad liquidity
provision  to  financial  institutions,  purchases  of  long-term  government  bonds,  and
intervention in key credit markets. Some central banks, such as the Federal Reserve (Fed),
the  Bank  of  England  (BoE)  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  (BOJ)  purchased  assets,  with  no
timeframe set to reduce their assets while the ECB limited itself to extend three years
loans to the banks. In an IMF staff position note, Klyuev et al. (2009) assessed that those
measures  “have  contributed  to  the  reduction  in  systemic  tail  risks  following  the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and to the recent improvements in market confidence
and risk appetite, as well as to the bottoming out in G-7 economies. However, financial
indicators suggest that some policies are proving to be more successful than others and
central banks may need to take further actions if market conditions regress”.
40 During the same period, the IMF dealt with the contagion effect of the global financial
crisis in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), which faced a sudden stop of
foreign loans. This was done with an unprecedented cooperation with the EU, as many of
these countries, like Hungary, Latvia and Romania, had already expressed their intention
to join the euro. Lutz and Kranke (2010) considered the case of Latvia “paradigmatic of
the profound disagreements between an austerity-demanding EU and a less austere IMF”.
The  authors  argued  that  “this  represents  a  European  rescue  of  the Washington
Consensus”. In the end, the IMF had to abide with the refusal of the Latvian government
to devalue their currency and their choice to pursue the path determined by the EU in
return for additional loans and the perspective of accessing the euro. As Blanchard (2012)
pointed out lately “given the strong commitment of both Latvia and its European Union
partners, the IMF went ahead with a program which kept the peg and included a strongly
front-loaded fiscal adjustment.”
41 Olivier Blanchard is  one of  the leading new Keynesians,  who have driven the debate
triggered  by  the  economic  crisis  among mainstream  economists  with  the  intent  of
overcoming the flaws and errors of pre-crisis analysis and policies prescriptions. Indeed,
a substantial part of the shift in the macroeconomic theory occurred within the IMF´s
research department headed by Blanchard. This shift was comprehensive as “the global
economic  crisis  taught  us  to  question  our  most  cherished beliefs  about  the  way  we
conduct macroeconomic policy” (Blanchard, 2011, pg 1). Or, just ahead in the same text
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“we’ve entered a brave new world in the wake of the crisis; a very different world in
terms of policy making and we just have to accept it.”
42 The first  signs of  the changing macroeconomic policy approach came to light in the
London summit of the G20 in April 2009 that pledged the strength of financial supervision
and regulation, indicating the recognition of the non-neutrality of financial markets and
of the importance of macroeconomic regulation. However, only in February 2010, the IMF
published the first paper addressing these issues, entitled “Rethinking Macroeconomic
Policy” (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010), which stated that several of pre-crisis
policy guidelines, usually recommended as solid macroeconomic policies, had significant
flaws or were even wrong. Their paper underlined three essential problems. First, with
inflation established around 2% in developed countries, nominal short term interest rates
were settled at a very low level. When the need of an easier monetary policy arose, the
nominal interest rate rapidly meets its zero lower bound, a liquidity trap situation. The
proposed solution would be to set a higher inflation target, around 4%, as a way to keep
nominal interest rates higher. Second, they pointed at the potential relevance of fiscal
policy as a countercyclical tool, when monetary policy and quantitative easing reach their
limits. Yet, in face of the already high levels of fiscal debt and deficit, it would be largely
desirable to adopt a countercyclical approach after the crisis in order to create fiscal
space.  The  third  problem lied  on  the  pre-crisis  assumption  of  the  non-neutrality  of
financial regulation in macroeconomic terms. Based on that experience, Blanchard et al.
(2010) highlighted the need to go beyond a purely micro approach to financial regulation
and  supervision.  The  search  for  macroprudential  policies  was  launched,  driving
mainstream economists  to think about the architecture of  post-crisis  macroeconomic
policy.  The  authors  even  admitted  to  consider  non-commercial  banks  financial
institutions as relevant agents to start or to spread financial crisis.
43 However,  in  November  2010,  the  Fund  slipped  back  to  its  old  beliefs  and,  wrongly
forecasting a more sustained recovery15, shifted away from recommending government
stimulus, replacing it with a call to major advanced economies for fiscal policy austerity. 
This recommendation came in a very different setting than the immediate aftermath of
the  crisis.  Since  the  second  half  of  2009,  when  the  acute  danger  of  another  Great
Depression  appeared  to  have  subsided,  conservative  convictions  focused  on  fiscal
consolidation came forcefully back. They acquired greater importance in the EU than in
other  advanced  countries,  causing  considerable  differences  in  their  "post-crisis"
economic  policies.  The  Greece´s  crisis  reinforced  the  European  option  of  completely
abandoning countercyclical  macroeconomic policies  and establishing fiscal  balance as
their top priority. 
 
The IMF as a member of the Troika
44 In  May  2010,  several  months  after  the  beginning  of  the  Greek  crisis,  the  European
Monetary Union (EMU) pledged € 720 billion to the creation of a temporary fund for the
redemption of  fragile  economies  of  the Eurozone (later  transformed in a  permanent
mechanism), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The IMF provided up to € 
220 billion to this entity, while the ECB announced that it would accept public securities
of  all  countries  in  the  EMU  as  collateral  for  loans.  Hence,  the  Troika  was  created.
According to Fritz et al. (2014), the IMF inclusion was peculiar “as the primary reason for
Europeans to include the IMF was not the need for funds, but rather the idea to draw
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upon the IMF’s wide experience in designing and implementing rescue packages and
adjustment programs in times of crisis”. On the Fund´s side, it can be said that it was not
exactly a choice to be made, as one of the most important of it´s raison d´être is precisely
to provide liquidity to countries facing financial crises with emergency loan packages tied
to conditionalities. It is worth noting that, while historically it acted on its own or with
the BIS as representative of the creditors, in the Troika the IMF operated as a minor
associate for the first time in its history.
45 In 2010, the IMF pledged some € 30 billion ($ 39 billion) of a total bailout package of € 110
billion to Greece, conditional on compliance with three key points set by the Troika: i) the
Greek government had to accept a fiscal effort equivalent to 11% of GDP in three years,
privatization of government assets and structural reforms; iii) payment of an interest rate
close to 5%, much higher than the cost of financing of the other countries of the EMU; iii)
in 2012,  Greece should be able to finance itself  in the market.  The repayment of the
bailout was scheduled to happen in several disbursements from May 2010 to June 2013.
46 This was followed by a second Troika´s rescue package of € 130billion, in March 2012, of
which  € 27  billion  were  provided  by  the  IMF,  conditional  on  the  implementation  of
another austerity package, combined with the continued demands for privatization and
structural reforms outlined in the first program. But it also required that most private
creditors  holding  Greek  government  bonds  should  sign  a  deal  accepting  extended
maturities,  lower  interest  rates,  and  a  53.5%  face  value  loss.  It  thus  preserved  the
holdings of the IMF and the ECB of such bonds. Both rescue packages kept the country
afloat and enable it to stay in the euro zone, but it came in exchange for harsh austerity
measures  that  have  deepened  the  Greek  recession,  currently  in  its  sixth  year,  with
skyrocketing unemployment rate.
47 Between the first and the second package to Greece, the Troika had to provide other ones
to Ireland and Portugal,  coming to the rescue of three countries in less than a year.
Ireland had to agree to pay interest of 5.8% per year, lower than the 7% required in the
Greece bailout, and undertake the herculean requirement to reduce its public deficit to
3% in 2015, which had reached 32% in 2010, including the bailouts of the banking system.
Political turmoil over the required harsh measures led to early elections that resulted in
the opposition´s victory. A new set of conditionalities was signed between the parties,
providing  some  less  stringent  measures.  As  for  Portugal,  the  deal  carried  similar
conditions, but with the particularity that it had to be endorsed by the main opposition
parties.
48 All rescue packages of the Troika were conditional on the adoption of measures of strong
fiscal contraction, leading economies subject to it to deflation, hampering the reduction
of its debt as a result of a decline in GDP and tax revenue. They were even harsher than
the requirements of the IMF to emerging countries in the 1980s and 1990s (section 2).
Here, the most peculiar feature of the nature of the crisis in the Eurozone stands up as
culprit. The members of the EMU lost the ability to issue currency and can no longer have
exchange rate adjustment. As Aglietta (2012, p. 20) highlighted: “The euro is, essentially, a
foreign currency for all the countries in the Euro Zone. It imposes rigid exchange rates,
regardless of their condition and underlying realities and deprives them of monetary
autonomy. In this sense, the euro´s functions today is very similar to the role of the dollar
to  Argentina  between  1991  and  2001,  when  the  exchange  rate  was  fixed  by  the
Constitution at parity with the dollar". In these conditions, the required conditionalities
lead to a much deeper economic contraction.
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49 The failure of the first Greek rescue package seems to mark the end of the IMF´s call for
fiscal  austerity.  For instance,  in 2011,  Blanchard (2011)  declared that  “In the age-old
discussion of the relative roles of markets and the state, the pendulum has swung—at
least a bit—toward the state”. In May 2013, the IMF published an ex post evaluation (IMF,
2013) on the first rescue package to Greece, acknowledging that it made "notable failures"
setting overly optimistic expectations for the country’s economy and underestimating
the effects of the austerity measures it imposed. As such, the fund said it lowered its own
standards on debt sustainability, setting with the EMU too high lending levels for Greece,
while not pushing hard enough on Greek debt restructuring. The report also points out
that the IMF and its partners significantly underestimated how much various austerity
measures,  such as  spending  cuts,  layoffs  and tax  increases,  would  impact  the  Greek
economy, facing a deep recession and an extremely difficult time managing to pay back.
50 In a more analytical approach, the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) of October 2012
(IMF, 2012) pointed to miscalculations on the size of fiscal multiplier and concludes that,
since  the  Great  Recession,  multipliers  have  been  much  higher  than  the  roughly  0.5
previously assumed, in the range of 0.9 to 1.7. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) resumed this
discussion, pointing at binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (also referred
to as “liquidity trap”) as an important factor to the negative short-term effects of a fiscal
consolidation on economic activity. They found that, in advanced economies, stronger
planned fiscal consolidation has been associated with lower growth than expected, with
the  relation  being  particularly  strong  (substantially  above  1),  both  statistically  and
economically, early in the crisis.
51 Following the IMF’s admission that austerity is more damaging than previously thought, a
split  opened up between the IMF and eurozone leaders,  Germany’s  finance minister,
Wolfgang Schäuble, and EC commissioner Olli Rehn have both taken issue with Christine
Lagarde  after  she  called  for  more  caution  on  austerity.  One  key  moment  of  the
disagreement between them came during the negotiations for the second rescue package
to Greece. Facing the inflexibility of European and particularly German representatives
on imposing losses to private creditors, Lagarde declared "if you want the IMF to remain
part of this, you’ll have to do something" (Der Spiegel, 2012).
52 It  is  possible that the particularities of  Spain´s rescue in 2012 were,  at  least  in part,
related  to  this  disagreement.  Spain  had  resisted  asking  for  international  help,  after
watching the requirements placed on Greece,  Portugal,  and Ireland. At EU insistence,
Spain Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy only accepted what he described as a “line of credit”,
a banking bailout, not a sovereign bailout. Rajoy pointed out that, unlike the bailouts that
went  to  Greece,  Portugal,  and  Ireland,  Spain’s  banking  bailout  came  with  no
“conditionality”. While the banks that received funding had specific conditions placed
upon them, Spain itself had no new economic rules imposed upon it from outside and did
not have to accept new cuts to the government’s budget, after the austerity measures
previously put in place (Minder et al., 2012).
53 Despite the IMF´s commitment to less austerity, Ms. Lagarde was at the negotiating table
for a bailout in Cyprus in 2013. She accepted a plan that included the usual demands for
austerity and reforms as well as an unfamiliar demand for a banking “bail-in” getting
debt holders and uninsured depositors to absorb bank losses and to stump up new capital.
Also for the first time in the history of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
bailouts, banks were closed for nearly two weeks and capital controls imposed at the time
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of its adoption. After a 2.4% drop in 2012, Cyprus´ GDP fell by 5.4% in 2013 and an 8.7%
decline is forecasted for 2014 (The Economist, 2014).
54 A year later, the IMF’s internal watchdog, the Independent Evaluation Office released a
report on macropolicies after the crisis (IEO, 2014) recognizing that “the recommended
policy  mix  was  not  appropriate,  as  monetary  expansion  is  relatively  ineffective  in
boosting  private  demand  following  a  financial  crisis”.  The  policies  resulted  in
“destabilizing spillover effects” in emerging markets including volatility in capital flows
and exchange rates, and subsequent analysis including from the IMF has indicated that
fiscal policy would have better boosted demand, the IEO said.
 
The new institutional view on capital controls
55 Regarding emerging economies, its main clients in the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF has also
made a clear shift in its official position regarding the evaluation of capital controls. This
change  took  place  after  many  of  these  economies  adopted  measures  to  protect
themselves  against  the  massive  inflow of  capital  induced  by  the  quantitative  easing
monetary policies adopted in the US, UK and Japan. As such, it can be said that the new
position on capital controls by this international organization represented a stamp of
respectability to these measures and, as discussed below, an attempt to limit its scope.
56 After publishing many working and policy papers on this issue over 2010 and 2012 (IMF
2010, 2011a, 2012b; Ostry et al. 2010, 2011a), a new institutional view on capital controls
was endorsed by the IMF in December 2012 (IMF 2012b), especially with regards to the
regulation of capital inflows. Regulation of capital outflows continues to be seen by the
IMF with much more caution, useful only during crisis periods and as a supplement to
more fundamental policy adjustment (IMF, 2012a).16
57 The main concern behind the recent change in the IMF’s position is that these inflows
may have a series of negative effects that could exceed the distortionary costs to the
domestic economy,  which have usually been highlighted as one of  the main costs  of
capital controls. The negative effects associated with large capital inflows in this new
view  can  be  multiple:  first,  an  appreciation  of  the  domestic  currency  beyond  the
equilibrium level; second, the fiscal costs of an accumulation of foreign exchange (FX)
reserves beyond the required level; third, the creation of inflationary pressures in the
event  of  incomplete  sterilization;  and fourth,  increased financial  fragility  due to  the
creation of bubbles in subsectors such as real estate or equity markets, which is magnified
by maturity and currency mismatches related to short-term foreign inflows.
58 In an initial paper, a staff position note of February 2010 (Ostry et al., 2010) that has since
received significant attention from academics and policy makers,17 the authors clearly
defined the application of capital inflow controls as a measure of last resort, when all
other macroeconomic policies are exhausted: “We argue that if the economy is operating
near potential, if reserves are adequate, if the exchange rate is not undervalued, and if
the flows are likely to be transitory, then controls on capital inflows – together with
macroeconomic policy adjustment and prudential measures – may usefully form part of
the policy toolkit.” (Ostry et al. 2011b, p. 562).
59 Since its initial publication on the topic, the IMF has produced a series of policy and
background papers in order to refine this new framework for capital controls (IMF 2010,
2011a, 2011b, 2012b; Ostry, 2011a), among which some especially focus on country studies
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(IMF  2011a  and  20011b).  While  these  papers  adhere  to  the  strict  formulation  of
macroeconomic preconditions that must be fulfilled, as cited above, they aim to define
more clearly the terms and concepts for an adequate management of capital inflows.
Moreover, they introduce some modifications with respect to the first papers, mainly in
the sense of being less rigid with regard to these preconditions and the hierarchy of
measures to be applied.
60 Much effort has been spent in these papers to give a clear cut definition for the regulation
of capital flows to be designed as a temporary instrument and to be adopted only in
exceptional  circumstances  and  within  a  broader  approach  of  capital  account
liberalization.  First,  capital  controls  are  defined as  measures  discriminating  between
residents and non-residents. Instead of a functional concept, this jurisdictional definition,
first introduced by Ostry (2011a, p. 11) and used in all subsequent IMF publications on the
issue,  was  brought  forward  by  the  OECD  in  its  Code  of  Liberalization  of  Capital
Movements  (2009).  This  definition  considers  capital  controls  to  be  subject  to
liberalization obligations only if they discriminate between residents and nonresidents.18
61 Based on this definition, in its “possible policy framework” (IMF 2011a, 5f. and 40f.) a
clear-cut triple hierarchy between instruments to manage capital flows is established.
They  argue  that  macroeconomic  policies  should  always  be  applied  first  and  until
exhaustion. They also outline a clear hierarchy between prudential regulations of the
domestic banking system, which might affect cross-border flows that are intermediated
by domestic financial institutions, and proper capital controls, defined as measures that
restrict  capital  transactions between residents  and nonresidents,  as  the latter  might,
from  a  welfare  perspective,  have  a  higher  distorting  effect  than  the  former.  Yet
distinguishing between prudential regulation and proper capital controls is in many cases
all but easy. For example, a measure limiting the exposure of domestic banks’ foreign
currency lending to unhedged domestic borrowers that discriminates on the basis  of
currency  denomination  instead  of  residency  would  count  as  prudential  financial
regulation,  even though it  would  in  fact  have  an effect  on capital  inflows  and thus
emulate a capital control measure.
62 This problem of an extremely narrow, jurisdictional definition has been somehow fixed
by the introduction of the new term “capital flow management measures (CFMs),” used in
all subsequent IMF publications, in place of “capital controls.” Of special relevance here is
the aforementioned “possible policy framework” (see IMF 2011a; also Ostry et al. 2011a)
as much as the final  version of  this  framework that defines a set  of  guidelines (IMF
2012b). Two explanations for the choice of this new term are provided: first, to avoid the
pejorative term “controls,” and second, to generate a broader definition that goes beyond
the strictly legal definition of capital controls.
63 CFMs are thus defined as the sum of the measures specifically designed to limit capital
flows.  It  comprises  measures  distinguishing  between residency  statuses  and between
currency denominations, as well as other regulations such as minimum holding periods
and taxes on specific investments that are typically applied in the nonfinancial sector
(IMF 2011a, 6, see also p. 40f.).
64 Even with this widened definition and a broader view of the concepts of proper
regulation of the domestic financial sector and of cross-border flows, the IMF until the
publication  of  its  definitive  policy  framework  (2012b),  carried  on  insisting  on  this
hierarchy, where the equal treatment of investors independently of their nationality is
the highest priority. It also introduced a further distinction between measures that are
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assumed to  have  the  potential  macroeconomic  and  multilateral  effect  of  dampening
currency appreciation,  and other measures of  a general  prudential  nature.  While the
latter may be used permanently, the former should be applied only as a second line of
defense and only for limited periods of time. This highly confusing distinction (and, thus,
the clear-cut triple hierarchy) has only been loosened in the final version of the IMF
framework,  where  the  authors  admit  the  possibility  of  overlapping  CFMs  and
Macroprudential Measures (MPMs), defined as prudential tools designed to limit systemic
financial risk and to maintain financial system stability. For instance, when capital flows
are the source of systemic financial sector risks, the tools used to address those risks can
be seen as both CFMs and MPMs (IMF 2012b, p. 21). The same applies for the preference
for price-based over quantity-based controls: whilst in the version of 2011, the former are
seen as more transparent and thus superior compared to the latter, this distinction in the
final version was dropped.
65 Although the new IMF’s institutional view is only incrementally different from the one
identified by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office in its assessment disclosed in 2005
(IEO, 2005), enormous advances have been made by this institution in its position on the
management of capital flows. The post-crisis approach goes into much greater detail on
the nature of capital account liberalization, on the specific conditions for using capital
controls as well as on the threshold of financial and economic development that need to
be reached before this  liberalization and on the sequence of  this  process  (Gallagher,
2012). Moreover, the Fund has recognized the potential dangers of capital inflow surges
in  terms  of  increasing  financial  fragility,  of  limiting  the  space  for  macroeconomic
policies, and thus the usefulness of capital controls (or CFMs) in certain circumstances.
66 At the same time, this new policy framework contains serious shortcomings. First, by
defining CFMs as a temporary instrument embedded in an overall strategy of financial
opening, the organization insists on the general advantages of financial liberalization,
which set serious limits to emerging economies’ policy space. Second, the asymmetric
character in the global context lays most of the burden of reacting to capital flow surges
on  the  receiving  countries.  Third,  the  Fund  keeps  defending  the  separation  of  a
permanent prudential  financial  regulation (referred to as MPMs) and only temporary
CFMs. In our view, this discrimination is not feasible especially in emerging economies
whose currencies are characterized a limited acceptance at the international level which
increases the potential harmful effects of international capital flows in terms of financial
fragility and macroeconomic management.
 
4. Conclusion
67 The analysis carried out in the former sections showed that after the collapse of Bretton
Woods,  on  the  contrary  of  its  original  mission,  the IMF performance  reinforced the
negative consequences of the hierarchical and asymmetrical feature of the International
Monetary and Financial System to emerging countries positioned at the bottom of the
currency hierarchy, among which a smaller degree of policy autonomy.
68 Indeed, the so-called Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank), had contributed
in a  decisive  manner to  the building and strengthening of  the current  international
monetary and financial system through the imposition of the neoliberal reforms, among
which stand out the capital flows liberalization, a pre-condition for the insertion of many
developing  countries  in  the  financial  globalization  setting,  making  them  emerging
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economies. Hence, the definition of CFMs as a temporary instrument is totally coherent
with the Fund`s role as an instrument of  US financial  hegemony in the post-Bretton
Woods era. Moreover, by rescuing countries facing financial crisis and preventing private
debt  defaults  in  the  two  moments  analyzed,  the  IMF  has  supported  the  interest  of
international  finance,  contributing  to  this  hegemony and to  the  maintenance  of  the
fiduciary and flexible dollar standard.
69 However, after the financial crisis of the 1990s, early 2000s, that brought to light their
higher vulnerability to the fickle nature of the capital flows, these countries have adopted
the widespread practice of accumulating reserves as a self-insurance strategy, becoming
independent from the Fund resources and enhancing their policy space. Consequently,
the IMF´s role of extending loans to those countries was greatly diminished, threatening
its finances and its very key role, at least for a while.
70 The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the subsequent euro crisis brought a revival
of its role and funding. The option of some European countries of joining the monetary
union to climb the currency hierarchy turned into a trap inasmuch it resulted in the loss
of monetary sovereignty and, hence, of the very policy autonomy. These countries ended
up victims of Troika´s rescue packages similar to those imposed by the IMF on emerging
and developing countries over the 1980s and 1990s, in spite of their specificities, among
which the impossibility to devaluate their currencies which would contribute to reduce
the external imbalances underlying the euro crisis.
71 At the same time, the crisis had substantial consequences for the IMF´s macroeconomic
theory and policy guidelines. The most radical change has been in the IMF’s research on
the need of including macroprudential aims in macroeconomic policies, followed by its
views on capital controls, and its interventions in the austerity debate (Gallagher and
Ban, 2014). More recently, it also addressed the question of the interconnectedness of
global banks and the systemic risks posed by securitization (Basurto et allii, 2015). The
changes in the IMF´s approach were at the root of its insistence to provide a debt relief to
Greece in the 2015 negotiations. However, it is still soon to conclude that those changes
may have long reaching effects, prompting important transformations in the mainstream
´s recommended macroeconomic policies.
72 On the other side, the inevitable question of the reasons of the great divide between the
fund´s new image and public analysis, on one hand, and the conditionality attached to the
rescue programs of countries in the eurozone, on the other hand, remains to be clearly
answered by the IMF. Two major hypotheses must be considered.
73 The first one is that most of those programs were started at a time in which the IMF
tended to accept EU decisions, major shareholder with the ECB in the EFSF, regarding the
priority of fiscal consolidation. Yet, this hypothesis seems in contradiction with the fact
that the Cyprus rescue package was designed and implemented in 2013, after the public
admittance by the IMF of the negative effects of fiscal austerity in times of crisis.
74 The  second  concerns  the  possibility  of  internal  divergences  between  the  research
department and the officers in charge of the definitions of the conditionalities and the
follow up of the rescue packages. If we accept this hypothesis, it is premature to consider
that “crisis-ridden countries that are keen to avoid punishing austerity packages can
exploit this doctrinal shift by exploring the policy implications of the IMF’s own official
fiscal  doctrine  and  staff  research.  They  can  cut  less  spending,  shelter  the  most
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disadvantaged, tax more at the top of income distribution and think twice before rushing
into a fast austerity package.” (Ban, 2014, p. 1)
75 Another  point  that  deserves  attention  is  the  fact  that,  although  the  IMF  regained
relevancy because of the global financial crisis, its importance may be threatened as the
reforms to give more powers to emerging economies in this international organization
agreed by world leaders in 2010 can be indefinitely delayed by the lack of approval of the
American Congress. Truman (2015) points that “after the Obama´s administration four
failed attempts to win congressional approval of quota and governance reform for the
IMF, it is time to recognize a difficult new reality”. He concludes that either the IMF
augments its funding and reforms its governing structure without full US participation or
it  loses  relevance  and clout.  It´s  no  wonder  if  emerging  countries  are  creating  new
multilateral  development  banks,  such  as  the  BRICS  Development  Bank  or  the  Asian
Development Bank as an alternative to World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
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NOTES
1. Based on information available until december 2014.
2. Fort  the  purpose  of  this  paper,  emerging  economies  are  the  developing  economies  that
entered into the financial globalization setting.
3. On the hierarchical nature of the international monetary systems anchored on a key-currency,
see Andrade and Prates (2013).
4. Besides the precautionary motive, another explanation pointed out by the literature for the
extraordinary  accumulation  of  international  reserves,  particularly  in  Asia,  is  to  hold  down
domestic currencies in order to improve external competitiveness and hence promote exports
(mercantilist motive) (see Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Park 2010).
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5. For a detailed comparison of the two plans, see Steil (2013). On the Keynes plan, see Keynes
(1980), Skydelsky (2000) and Dostaler (2005).
6. “The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are: (i) To promote international monetary
cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and
collaboration on international monetary problems; (ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources
of all members as primary objectives of economic policy; (iii) To promote exchange stability, to
maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation; (iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect to
current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions
which hamper the growth of world trade;  (v) To give confidence to members by making the
Fund’s  resources  available  to  them  under  adequate  safeguards,  thus  providing  them  with
opportunity  to  correct  maladjustments  in  their  balance  of  payments  without  resorting  to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity (vi) In accordance with the above, to
shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of
payments of members”.
7. On the introduction of conditionalities in IMF loans, see Horsefield (1969a).
8. Financial programming just connects the result of the balance of payments (the variation of
international reserves) with the balance sheet of the monetary authorities. Creation of money
(the monetary liability of the central bank) finances the purchase of domestic assets (securities
bought in the open market and the debt of the domestic banking system) and of foreign assets
(international  reserves).  Thus,  limits  on  the  creation  of  money  and  on  domestic  assets´  the
growth (assumed related to aggregate demand) should achieve balance of payments objectives
(Carvalho, 2009). On financial programming, see De Vries (1976), pp. 363/368.
9. On these approaches, see Krueger (1983).
10. As already mentioned the main clients of the Fund in its first twenty years were developed
countries, not willing to submit their economic structures to changes demanded by a multilateral
institution (Carvalho, 2009).
11. See Strange (1986).
12. The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) was established in 2001 to conduct independent and
objective evaluations of Fund policies and activities.  Under its Terms of Reference,  it  is  fully
independent from the Management of the IMF and operates at arm's length from the Board of
Executive Directors.
13. Vernengo and Ford (2014) analysed recent edtions of the two main IMF reports – the World
Economic  Outlook  and  the  Global  Financial  Stability  Report  –  and  policy  advice  attached  to
recent european country arrangements and concluded that “…even a most optimistic Reading of
IMF reports and country arrangements disappoints. The power structure ultimately remains the
same: the Fund continues to be a mechanism through creditor countries enforce contractionary
policy on indebted countries” (p.1194).
14. The Group of 20 (G20) became the prominent agent in the international coordination of the
response to the crisis, to replace the Group of seven richest countries in the world (G7).
15. IMF´s projections as of late 2009 indicated that economic growth in advanced economies
would turn positive in 2010 and strengthen in the medium term.
16. The following paragraphs on the new IMF approach on capital controls are based on Fritz and
Prates (2014). Due to limit of space, we focus on capital inflow regulation, as these have been in
the center of the debate.
17. Rodrik  (2010),  commenting  on  the  shift  in  the  IMF’s  evaluation  of  capital  controls,
enthusiastically called this “an end of an era in finance.”
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18. Ostry (2011a, p. 11) state that there is no unique, generally accepted legal definition of capital
controls, as in the broadest sense these are measures meant to affect the cross-border movement
of capital. An explanation for the highlighting of this jurisdictive criteria is provided by the IMF
(2011a,  p. 45):  “This  prioritization  of  measures  takes  into  account  institutional  and  political
economy concerns flowing from the general standard of fairness that a member expects that its
nationals will enjoy as a result of its participation in a multilateral framework.”
ABSTRACTS
Two intertwined questions arise regarding the IMF performance after the global financial crisis:
to what extent the new IMF analytical approach and the related policy prescriptions differ from
the  ones  prevailing  before  the  2008  global  financial  crisis?  Has  there  been  a  disconnection
between the changes in the IMF analytical and normative approach and its practice, in other
words, the policy conditionalities embodied in the eurozone rescue packages? This paper aims at
contributing  to  address  these  questions  taking  into  account  the  US  financial  hegemony
underlying the features of the post-Bretton Woods international monetary and financial system,
namely, the fiduciary and flexible dollar at the top of the currency hierarchy and the almost free
capital mobility.
L’action  du  FMI  depuis  la  crise  financière  mondiale  interroge  ses  performances  sur  deux
questions  interdépendantes :  dans  quelle  mesure,  le  renouveau  de  ses  analyses  et  les
prescriptions  de  politiques  diffèrent  de  celles  prévalant  avant  cette  crise ?  Existe-t-il  une
déconnexion  entre  les  changements  analytiques  et  normatifs  du  FMI  et  sa  pratique,  plus
précisément quant aux conditionnalités relatives aux politiques publiques préconisées dans les
plans de sauvetage de la zone euro ? Cet article apporte des éléments de réponse à ces questions
en  les  abordant  au  regard  de  l’hégémonie  financière  américaine  qui  sous-tend  les
caractéristiques du système monétaire et financier international post-Bretton Woods, à savoir, le
dollar fiduciaire et flexible au sommet de la hiérarchie monétaire et la presque totale liberté de
circulation du capital.
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